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Abstract—The problem of characterizing impacts of data qual-
ity on real-time locational marginal price (LMP) is considered.
Because the real-time LMP is computed from the estimated
network topology and system state, bad data that cause errors
in topology processing and state estimation affect real-time LMP.
It is shown that the power system state space is partitioned
into price regions of convex polytopes. Under different bad data
models, the worst case impacts of bad data on real-time LMP
are analyzed. Numerical simulations are used to illustrate worst
case performance for IEEE-14 and IEEE-118 networks.
Keywords-locational marginal price (LMP), real-time market,
power system state estimation, bad data detection, cyber security
of smart grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE deregulated electricity market has two interconnectedcomponents. The day-ahead market determines the loca-
tional marginal price (LMP) based on the dual variables of
the optimal power flow (OPF) solution [1], [2], given gen-
erator offers, demand forecast, system topology, and security
constraints. The calculation of LMP in the day-ahead market
does not depend on the actual system operation. In the real-
time market, on the other hand, an ex-post formulation is often
used (e.g., by PJM and ISO-New England [3]) to calculate
the real-time LMP by solving an incremental OPF problem.
The LMPs in the day-ahead and the real-time markets are
combined in the final clearing and settlement processes.
The real-time LMP is a function of data collected by the
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system.
Therefore, anomalies in data, if undetected, will affect prices
in the real-time market. While the control center employs
a bad data detector to “clean” the real-time measurements,
miss detections and false alarms will occur inevitably. The
increasing reliance on the cyber system also comes with the
risk that malicious data may be injected by an adversary to
affect system and real-time market operations. An intelligent
adversary can carefully design a data attack to avoid detection
by the bad data detector.
Regardless of the source of data errors, it is of significant
value to assess potential impacts of data quality on the real-
time market, especially when a smart grid may in the future
deploy demand response based on real-time LMP. To this end,
we are interested in characterizing the impact of worst case
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data errors on the real-time LMP. The focus on the worst case
also reflects the lack of an accurate model of bad data and our
desire to include the possibility of data attacks.
A. Summary of Results and Organization
We aim to characterize the worst effects of data corrup-
tion on real-time LMP. By “worst”, we mean the maximum
perturbation of real-time LMP caused by bad or malicious
data, when a fixed set of data is subject to corruption. The
complete characterization of worst data impact, however, is
not computationally tractable. Our goal here is to develop
an optimization based approach to search for locally worst
data by restricting the network congestion to a set of lines
prone to congestion. We then apply computationally tractable
(greedy search) algorithms to find the worst data and evaluate
the effects of worst data by simulations.
In characterizing the relation between data and real-time
LMP, we first present a geometric characterization of the real-
time LMP. In particular, we show that the state space of the
power system is partitioned into polytope price regions, as
illustrated in Fig. 1(a), where each polytope is associated with
a unique real-time LMP vector, and the price region Xi is
defined by a particular set of congested lines that determine
the boundaries of the price region.
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Fig. 1: Change of real-time LMPs due to bad data.
Two types of bad data are considered in this paper. One is
the bad data associated with meter measurements such as the
branch power flows in the network. Such bad data will cause
errors in state estimation, possibly perturbing, as an example,
the correct state estimate xˆ in X0 to x˜ in X3 (as shown in
Fig. 1(a)). The analysis of the worst case data then corresponds
to finding the worst measurement error such that it perturbs
the correct state estimation to the worst price region.
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The second type of bad data, one that has not been carefully
studied in the context of LMP in the literature, is error in
digital measurements such as switch or breaker states. Such
errors lead directly to topology errors therefore causing a
change in the polytope structure as illustrated in Fig. 1(b).
In this case, even if the estimated system state changes little,
the prices associated with each region change, sometimes quite
significantly.
Before characterizing impacts of bad meter data on LMP, we
need to construct appropriate models for bad data. To this end,
we propose three increasingly more powerful bad data models
based on the dependencies on real-time system measurements:
state independent bad data, partially adaptive bad data, and
fully adaptive bad data.
In studying the worst case performance, we adopt a widely
used approach that casts the problem as one involving an
adversary whose goal is to make the system performance as
poor as possible. The approach of finding the worst data is
equivalent to finding the optimal strategy of an attacker who
tries to perturb the real-time LMP and avoid being detected at
the same time. By giving the adversary more information about
the network state and endowing him with the ability to change
data, we are able to capture the worst case performance,
sometimes exactly and sometimes as bounds on performance.
Finally, we perform simulation studies using the IEEE-14
and IEEE-118 networks. We observe that bad data independent
of the system state seems to have limited impact on real-time
LMPs, and greater price perturbations can be achieved by
state dependent bad data. The results also demonstrate that
the real-time LMPs are subject to much larger perturbation if
bad topology data are present in addition to bad meter data.
While substantial price changes can be realized for small
networks by the worst meter data, as the size of network grows
while the measurement redundancy rate remains the same, the
influence of worst meter data on LMP is reduced. However,
larger system actually gives more possibilities for the bad
topology data to perturb the real-time LMP more significantly.
Our simulation results also show a degree of robustness
provided by the nonlinear state estimator. While there have
been many studies on data injection attacks based on DC
models, very few consider the fact that the control center
typically employs the nonlinear WLS state estimator under the
AC model. Our simulation shows that effects of bad analog
data designed based on DC model may be mitigated by the
nonlinear estimator whereas bad topology data coupled with
bad analog data can have greater impacts on LMP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly describes a model of real-time LMP and introduces
its geometric characterization in the state space of the power
system. Section III establishes the bad data models and sum-
marizes state estimation and bad data detection procedures at
the control center. In Section IV, a metric of impact on real-
time LMP caused by bad meter data is introduced. We then
discuss the algorithms of finding worst case bad meter data
vector in terms of real-time price perturbation under the three
different bad data models. Section V considers the effect of
bad topology data on real-time LMP. Finally, in Section VI,
simulation results are presented based on IEEE-14 and IEEE-
118 networks.
B. Related Work
Effects of bad data on power system have been studied
extensively in the past, see [4], [5], [6]. Finding the worst case
bad data is naturally connected with the problem of malicious
data. In this context, the results presented in this paper can be
viewed as one of analyzing the impact of the worst (malicious)
data attack.
In a seminal paper by Liu, Ning, and Reiter [7], the authors
first illustrated the possibility that, by compromising enough
number of meters, an adversary can perturb the state estimate
arbitrarily in some subspace of the state space without being
detected by any bad data detector. Such attacks are referred
to as strong attacks. It was shown by Kosut et al. [8] that
the condition for the existence of such undetectable attacks is
equivalent to the classical notion of network observability.
When the adversary can only inject malicious data from a
small number of meters, strong attacks do not exist, and any
injected malicious data can be detected with some probability.
Such attacks are referred to as weak attacks [8]. In order
to affect the system operation in some meaningful way, the
adversary has to risk being detected by the control center. The
impacts of weak attack on power system are not well under-
stood because the detection of such bad data is probabilistic.
Our results are perhaps the first to quantify such impacts.
Most related research works focused on DC model and linear
estimator while only few have addressed the nonlinearity effect
[9], [10].
It is well recognized that bad data can also cause topology
errors [11], [12], and techniques have been developed to detect
topology errors. For instance, the residue vector from state
estimation was analyzed for topology error detection [12],
[11], [13]. Monticelli [14] introduced the idea of generalized
state estimation where, roughly speaking, the topology that
fits the meter measurements best is chosen as the topology
estimate. The impacts of topology errors on electricity market
have not been reported in the literature, and this paper aims
to bridge this gap.
The effect of data quality on real-time market was first
considered in [15], [16]. In [16], the authors presented the
financial risks induced by the data perturbation and proposed
a heuristic technique for finding a case where price change
happens. While there are similarities between this paper and
[16], several significant differences exist: (i) This paper fo-
cuses on finding the worst case, not only a feasible case.
(ii) This paper considers a more general class of bad data
where bad data may depend dynamically on the actual system
measurements rather than static. (iii) This paper considers a
broader range of bad data that also include bad topology data,
and our evaluations are based on the AC network model and
the presence of nonlinear state estimator.
II. STRUCTURES OF REAL-TIME LMP
In this section, we present first a model for the computation
of real-time locational marginal price (LMP). While ISOs have
somewhat different methods of computing real-time LMP, they
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share the same two-settlement architecture and similar ways
of using real-time measurements. In the following, we will use
a simplified ex-post real-time market model, adopted by PJM,
ISO New England, and other ISOs [17], [3]. We view this
model as a convenient mathematical abstraction that captures
the essential components of the real-time LMP calculation.
For this reason, our results should be interpreted within the
specified setup. Our purpose is not to include all details; we
aim to capture the essential features.
In real-time, in order to monitor and operate the system, the
control center will calculate the estimated system conditions
(including bus voltages, branch flows, generation, and demand)
based on real-time measurements. We call a branch congested
if the estimated flow is larger than or equal to the security
limit. The congestion pattern is defined as the set of all
congested lines, denoted as Cˆ. Note that we use hat (e.g., Cˆ)
to denote quantities or sets that are estimated based on real-
time measurements. Details of state estimation and bad data
detection are discussed in Section III-B.
One important usage of state estimation is calculating the
real-time LMP. Given the estimated congestion pattern Cˆ, the
following linear program is solved to find the incremental OPF
dispatch and associated real-time LMP, λˆ = (λˆi) [17]:
minimize
∑
cGi∆pi −
∑
cLj∆dj
subjcet to ∑∆pi =∑∆dj
∆pmini ≤ ∆pi ≤ ∆p
max
i
∆dminj ≤ ∆dj ≤ ∆d
max
j∑
iAki∆pi −
∑
j Akj∆dj ≤ 0, for all k ∈ Cˆ,(1)
where ∆d = (∆dj) is the vector of incremental dispatchable
load, ∆p = (∆pi) the vector of incremental generation
dispatch, cG = (cGi ) and cL = (cLj) the corresponding real-time
marginal cost of generations and dispatchable loads, ∆pmini and
∆pmaxi the lower and upper bounds for incremental generation
dispatch, ∆dmini and ∆dmaxi the lower and upper bounds
for incremental dispatchable load, and Aki the sensitivity of
branch flow on branch k with respect to the power injection
at bus i.
The real-time LMP at bus i is defined as the overall cost
increase when one unit of extra load is added at bus i, which
is calculated as
λˆi = η −
∑
k∈Cˆ
Akiµk. (2)
where η is the dual variable for the load-generation equality
constraint, and µk is the dual variable corresponding to the
line flow constraint in (1).
Note that in practice, the control center may use the ex-
ante congestion pattern, which is obtained by running a 5
minute ahead security-constrained economic dispatch with
the state estimation results and the forecasted loads (for the
next five-minute interval) and choosing the lines congested
at the dispatch solution [17], [18]. However, to avoid the
complication due to ex-ante dispatch calculation, we assume
that real-time pricing employs the estimated congestion pattern
Cˆ obtained from state estimation results. By doing so, we
attempt to find direct relations among bad data, the state
estimate, and real-time LMPs. Notice that once the congestion
pattern Cˆ is determined, the whole incremental OPF problem
(1) no longer depends on the measurement data.
Under the DC model, the power system state, x, is defined
as the vector of voltage phases, except the phase on the
reference bus. The power flow vector f is a function of the
system state x,
f = Fx, (3)
where F is the sensitivity matrix of branch flows with respect
to the system state.
Assume the system has n + 1 buses. Then, x ∈ X =
[−π, π]n, where X represents the state space. Any system
state corresponds to a unique point in X. From (3), the branch
flow f is determined by the system state x. Comparing the
flows with the flow limits, we obtain the congestion pattern
associated with this state. Hence, each point in the state space
corresponds to a particular congestion pattern.
We note that the above expression in (2) appears earlier in
[1] where the role of congestion state in LMP computation
was discussed. In this paper, our objective is to make explicit
the connection between data and LMP. We therefore need a
linkage between data and congestion. To this end, we note that
the power system state, the congestion state, and LMP form
a Markov chain, which led to a geometric characterization
of LMP on the power system state space, as shown in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Price Partition of the State Space): Assume
that the LMP exists for every possible congestion pattern∗.
Then, the state space X is partitioned into a set of polytopes
{Xi} where the interior of each Xi is associated with a
unique congestion pattern Ci and a real-time LMP vector.
Each boundary hyperplane of Xi is defined by a single
transmission line.
Proof: For a particular congestion pattern C defined by a
set of congested lines, the set of states that gives C is given
by
Xi
∆
={x : Fi·x ≥ T
max
i ∀i ∈ C, Fj·x < T
max
j ∀j /∈ C},
where Fi· is the ith row of F (see (3)), and Tmaxj the flow
limit on branch j. Since Xi is defined by the intersection of a
set of half spaces, it is a polytope.
Given an estimated congestion pattern Cˆ, the envelop the-
orem [19] implies that for any optimal primal solution and
dual solution of (1) that satisfy the KKT conditions, (2) always
gives the derivative of the optimal objective value with respect
to the demand at each bus, which we assume exists, i .e., each
congestion pattern is associated with a unique real-time LMP
vector λ. Hence, all states with the same congestion pattern
share the same real-time LMP, which means each polytope Xi
in X corresponds to a unique real-time LMP vector.
Theorem 1 characterizes succinctly the relationship between
the system state and LMP. As illustrated in Fig. 1(a), if bad
data are to alter the LMP in real-time, the size of the bad data
has to be sufficiently large so that the state estimate at the
∗This is equivalent to assuming that the derivative of the optimal value of
(1) with respect to demand at each bus exists
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control center is moved to a different price region from the
true system state.
On the other hand, if some lines are erroneously removed
from or added to the correct topology, as illustrated in
Fig. 1(b), it affects the LMP calculation in three ways†. First,
the state estimate is perturbed since the control center employs
an incorrect topology in state estimation. Secondly, the price
partition of the state space changes due to the errors in
topology information. Third, the shift matrix A in (1), which is
a function of topology, changes thereby altering prices attached
to each price region.
III. DATA MODEL AND STATE ESTIMATION
A. Bad Data Model
1) Meter data: In order to monitor the system, various
meter measurements are collected in real time, such as power
injections, branch flows, voltage magnitudes, and phasors,
denoted by a vector z ∈ Rm. ‡ If there exists bad data a among
the measurements, the measurement with bad data, denoted by
za, can be expressed as a function of the system states x,
za = z + a = h(x) + w + a, a ∈ A, (4)
where w represents the random measurement noise.
We make a distinction here between the measurement
noise and bad data; the former accounts for random noise
independently distributed across all meters whereas the latter
represents the perturbation caused by bad or malicious data.
We assume no specific pattern for bad data except that they
do not happen everywhere. We assume that bad data can only
happen in a subset of the measurements, S. We call S as set
of suspectable meters, which means the meter readings with
in S may subject to corruption. If the cardinality of S is k,
the feasible set of bad data a is a k-dimensional subspace,
denoted as A = {a : ai = 0 for all i /∈ S}.
We will consider three bad data models with increasing
power of affecting state estimates.
M1. State independent bad data: This type of bad data is
independent of real-time measurements. Such bad data may
be the replacement of missing measurements.
M2. Partially adaptive bad data: This type of bad data may
arise from the so-called man in the middle (MiM) attack where
an adversary intercepts the meter data and alter the data based
on what he has observed. Such bad data can adapt to the
system operating state.
M3. Fully adaptive bad data: This is the most powerful
type of bad data, constructed based on the actual measurement
z = h(x) + w.
†In addition to these, the change in topology will affect contingency
analysis. Such effect will appear as changes in contingency constraints in real-
time LMP calculation (1) [17]. However, dealing with contingency constraints
will significantly complicate our analysis and possibly obscure the more direct
link between bad data and real-time LMP. Hence, we consider only line
congestion constraints in (1).
‡Notice here both conventional measurements and PMU measurements can
be incorporated. Although PMU data seem to have more direct impact on state
estimation and real-time LMP calculation, we won’t differentiate the types of
measurements in the following discussion.
Note that M3 is in general not realistic. Our purpose of
considering this model is to use it as a conservative proxy to
obtain performance bounds for the impact of worst case data.
We assume herein a DC model in which the measurement
function h(·) in (4) is linear. Specifically,
za = Hx+ w + a, a ∈ A, (5)
where H is the measurement matrix. Such a DC model,
while widely used in the literature, may only be a crude
approximation of the real power system. By making such a
simplifying assumption and acknowledging its weaknesses,
we hope to obtain tractable solutions in searching for worst
case scenarios. It is important to note that, although the worst
case scenarios are derived from the DC model, we carry out
simulations using the actual nonlinear system model.
2) Topology data: Topology data are represented by a
binary vector s ∈ {0, 1}l, where each entry of s represents
the state of a line breaker (0 for open and 1 for closed). The
bad topology data is modeled as
sb = s+ b (mod 2), b ∈ B, (6)
where B ⊂ {0, 1}l is the set of possible bad data. When
bad data are present, the topology processor will generate
the topology estimate corresponding to sb, and this incorrect
topology estimate will be passed to the following operations
unless detected by the bad data detector.
B. State Estimation
We assume that the control center employs the standard
weighted least squares (WLS) state estimator. Under DC
model,
xˆ = argmin
x
(z −Hx)TR−1(z −Hx) = Kz, (7)
where R is the covariance matrix of measurement noise w,
and K , (HTR−1H)−1HTR−1.
If the noise w is Gaussian, the WLS estimator is also
the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of state x. By the
invariant property of MLE, from (3), the maximum likelihood
estimate of the branch flows is calculated as
fˆ = F xˆ = FKz. (8)
The congestion pattern used in real-time LMP calculation
(1) is directly from state estimation and consists of all the
estimated branch flows which are larger than or equal to the
branch flow limits, i .e.,
Cˆ = {j : fˆj ≥ T
max
j }, (9)
where Tmaxj is the flow limit on branch j.
In the presence of bad meter data a, the meter measurements
collected by control center is actually za = Hx + w + a. By
using za, the WLS state estimate is
xˆa = Kza = xˆ
∗ +Ka, (10)
where xˆ∗ = Kz is the “correct” state estimate without the
presence of the bad data (i.e., a = 0).
Eq. (10) shows that the effect of bad data on state estimation
is linear. However, because a is confined in a k-dimensional
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subspace A, the perturbation on the actual system state is
limited to a certain direction.
When bad data exist both in meter and topology data,
the control center uses a wrong measurement matrix H¯,
corresponding to the altered topology data, and the altered
meter data za. Then, the WLS state estimate becomes
xˆa = K¯za = K¯z + K¯a, (11)
where K¯ , (H¯TR−1H¯)−1H¯TR−1. Note that unlike the linear
effect of bad meter data, bad topology data affects the state
estimate by altering the measurement matrix H to H¯ .
C. Bad Data Detection
The control center uses bad data detection to minimize
the impact of bad data. Here, we assume a standard bad
data detection used in practice, the J(xˆ)-detector in [5]. In
particular, the J(xˆ)-detector performs the test on the residue
error, r , z − Hxˆ, based on the state estimate xˆ. From the
WLS state estimate (7), we have
r =
(
I −H(HTR−1H)−1HTR−1
)
z = Uz. (12)
where U∆=(I −H(HTR−1H)−1HTR−1)
The J(xˆ)-detector is a threshold detector defined by
rTR−1r = zTWz
bad data
≷
good data
τ, (13)
where τ is the threshold calculated from a prescribed false
alarm probability, and W ∆=UTR−1U . When the measurement
data fail to pass the bad data test, the control center declares
the existence of bad data and takes corresponding actions to
identify and remove the bad data.
In this paper, we are interested in those cases when bad data
are present while the J(xˆ)-detector fails to detect them.
IV. IMPACT OF BAD DATA ON LMP
In this section, we examine the impact of bad data on LMP,
assuming that the topology estimate of the network is correct.
One thing to notice is that in searching for the “worst” case,
we take the perspective of the control center, not that of the
attacker. In particular, we look for the worst congestion pattern
for the LMP computation, even if this particular congestion
pattern is difficult for the attacker to discover. So the focus
here is not how easy it is for an attacker to find a locally
worst congestion pattern; it is how much such a congestion
pattern affects the LMP.
A. Average Relative Price Perturbation
In order to quantify the effect of bad data on real-time price,
we need to first define the metric to measure the effect. We
define the relative price perturbation (RPP) as the expected
percentage price perturbation caused by bad data. Given that
LMP varies at different buses, RPP also varies at different
locations.
Let za be the data received at the control center and λi(za)
the LMP at bus i. The RPP at bus i is a function of bad data
a, given by
RPPi(a) = E
(∣∣∣∣λi(za)− λi(z)λi(z)
∣∣∣∣
)
, (14)
where the expectation is over random state and measurement
noise.
To measure the system-wide price perturbation, we define
the average relative price perturbation (ARPP) by
ARPP(a) =
1
n+ 1
∑
i
RPPi(a), (15)
where n+ 1 is the number of buses in the system.
The worst case analysis to be followed can be used for
other metrics (e.g., price increase ratios or price decrease
ratios, which are closely related to the market participants’
gain or loss). Similar results can be showed following the same
strategies. However, the comparison among different metrics
is beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Worst ARPP under State Independent Bad Data Model
First, we consider the state independent bad data model
(M1) given in Section III-A. In this model, the bad data are
independent of real-time measurements.
In constructing the state independent worst data, it is useful
to incorporate prior information about the state. To this end,
we assume that system state follows a Gaussian distribution
with mean x0, covariance matrix Σx. Typically, we choose x0
as the day-ahead dispatch since the nominal system state in
real-time varies around its day-ahead projection.
In the presence of bad data a, the expected state estimate
and branch flow estimate on branch i are given by
E[xˆ] = x0 +Ka. (16)
E[fi] = Fi·E[xˆ] = Fi·x0 + Fi·Ka, (17)
where Fi· is the corresponding row of branch i in F .
Our strategy is to make this expected state estimate into
the region with the largest price perturbation among all the
possible regions, Cˆ∗. From (9), this means making all the
expected branch flows satisfy the boundary condition of Cˆ∗,
E[fi] ≥ T
max
i for i ∈ Cˆ∗
E[fi] ≤ T
max
j for j /∈ Cˆ∗.
(18)
However, due to the uncertainty (from both system state
x and measurement noise w), the actual estimated state after
attack, xˆ, may be different from E[xˆ]. Therefore, we want to
make E[xˆ] at the “center” of the desired price region, i .e.,
maximizing the shortest distance from E[xˆ] to the boundaries
of the polytope price regions while still holding the boundary
constraints. The shortest distance can be calculated as
β = min{β˜ : |E[fi]− Tmax| ≥ β˜ for all i}. (19)
However, the existence of bad data detector prevents the
bad data vector a from being arbitrarily large. According to
(12), the weighted squared residue with a is
rTR−1r = zTaWza = (w + a)
TW (w + a). (20)
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since WHx = 0
Heuristically, since w has zero mean, the term aTWa can be
used to quantify the effect of data perturbation on estimation
residue. Then we use aTWa ≤ ǫ to control the detection
probability in the following optimization.
Therefore, for a specific congestion pattern Cˆ, the adversary
will solve the following optimization problem to move the
state estimate to the “center” of the price region Cˆ and keeping
the detection probability low.
maxa∈A,β˜≥0 β˜
subject to E[fi]− β˜ ≥ Tmaxi , i ∈ Cˆ
E[fi] + β˜ < T
max
j , j /∈ Cˆ
aTWa ≤ ǫ,
(21)
which is a convex program that can be solved easily in
practice. We call a region Cˆ feasible if it makes problem (21)
feasible.
Among all the feasible congestion patterns, the worst region
Cˆ∗ is chosen as the one giving the largest ARPP.
Cˆ∗ = arg max
Cˆ∈Γ
|λ˜i − λi(Cˆ)|, (22)
where λ˜i is the LMP at bus i if the x0 is the system state, and Γ
the set of all the feasible congestion patterns. Hence, the worst
case constant bad data vector is the solution to optimization
problem (21) by setting the congestion pattern as Cˆ∗.
C. Worst ARPP under Partially Adaptive Bad Data
For bad data model M2, only part of the measurement values
in real-time are known to the adversary, denoted as zo. The
adversary has to first make an estimation of the system state
from the observation and prior distribution, then make the
attack decision based on the estimation result.
Without the presence of bad data vector, i .e., a = 0, the
system equation (5) gives
zo = Hox+ wo, (23)
where Ho is the rows of H corresponding to the observed mea-
surements and wo the corresponding part in the measurement
noise w.
The minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimate of x
given zo is given by the conditional mean
E(x|zo) = x0 +ΣxH
T
o (HoΣxH
T
o )
−1(zo −Hox0). (24)
Then, the flow estimate on branch i after attack is
E[fi|zo] = Fi·E[xˆ|zo]. (25)
Still, we want to move the estimation of state to the “center”.
On the other hand, the expected measurement value E[za|zo] =
HE[zˆ|zo] + a. Again, we need a pre-designed parameter ǫ to
control the detection probability. Therefore, the solution to
the following optimization problem is the best attack given
congestion pattern A
maxa∈A,β˜≥0 β˜
subject to E[fi|zo]− β˜ ≥ Tmaxi , i ∈ Cˆ
E[fi|zo] + β˜ < T
max
j , j /∈ Cˆ
(HE[za|zo]
T)W (HE[za|zo]) ≤ ǫ.
(26)
This problem is also a convex optimization problem, which
can be easily solved. Among all the Cˆ’s which make the above
problem feasible, we choose the one with the largest price
perturbation, denoted as Cˆ∗. The solution to problem (26) with
Cˆ∗ as the congestion pattern is the worst bad data vector.
D. Worst ARPP under Fully Adaptive Bad Data
Finally, we consider the bad data model M3, in which the
whole set of measurements z is known to the adversary. The
worst bad data vector depends on the value of z. Different from
the previous two models, with bad data vector a, the estimated
state is deterministic without uncertainty. In particular
xˆ = Kz +Ka. (27)
And the estimated flow on branch i after attack is also
deterministic
fˆi = Fi·xˆ = Fi·Kz + Fi·Ka. (28)
Similar to the previous two models, congestion pattern is
called feasible if there exists some bad data vector a to make
the following conditions satisfied:
fˆi ≥ T
max
i , i ∈ Cˆ
fˆi < T
max
j , j /∈ Cˆ
(z + a)TW (z + a) ≤ τ, a ∈ A.
(29)
Among all the feasible congestion patterns, we choose the
one with the largest price perturbation, Cˆ∗. Any bad data vector
a satisfying condition (29) can serve as the worst fully adaptive
bad data.
E. A Greedy Heuristic
The strategies presented above are based on the exhaustive
search over all possible congestion patterns. Such approaches
are not scalable for large networks with a large number
of possible congestion patterns. We now present a greedy
heuristic approach aimed at reducing computation cost. In
particular, we develop a gradient like algorithm that searches
among a set of likely congestion patterns.
First, we restrict ourselves to the set of lines that are close
to their respective flow limits and look for bad data that
will affect the congestion pattern. The intuition is that it is
unlikely that bad data can drive the system state sufficiently
far without being detected by the bad data detector. In practice,
the cardinality of such a set is usually very small compared
with the systems size.
Second, we search for the worst data locally by changing
one line in the congestion pattern at a time. Specifically,
suppose that a congestion pattern is the current candidate for
the worst data. Given a set of candidate lines that are prone
to congestions, we search locally by flipping one line at a
time from the congested state to the un-congested state and
vice versa. If no improvement can be made, the algorithm
stops. Otherwise, the algorithm updates the current “worst
congestion pattern” and continue. The effectiveness of this
greedy heuristic is tested in Section VI-C.
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V. BAD TOPOLOGY DATA ON LMP
So far, we have considered bad data in the analog measure-
ments. In this section, we include the bad topology data, and
describe another bad data model.
We represent the network topology by a directed graph G =
(V,E) where each i ∈ V denotes a bus and each (i, j) ∈
E denotes a connected transmission line. For each physical
transmission line (e.g., a physical line between i and j), we
assign an arbitrary direction (e.g., (i, j)) for the line, and (i, j)
is in E if and only if bus i and bus j are connected.
Bad data may appear in both analog measurements and
digital (e.g., breaker status) data, as described in Section III-A:
za = z + a = (Hx+ w) + a, a ∈ A,
sb = s+ b (mod 2), b ∈ B. (30)
As in Section IV, we employ the adversary model to
describe the worst case. The adversary alters s to sb by adding
b from the set of feasible attack vectors B ⊂ {0, 1}l such that
the topology processor produces the “target” topology G¯ as
the topology estimate. In addition, the adversary modifies z
by adding a ∈ A such that za looks consistent with G¯.
In this section, we focus on the worst case when the
adversary is able to alter the network topology without chang-
ing the state estimate§. We also require that such bad data
are generated by an adversary causing undetectable topology
change, i.e., the bad data escape the system bad data detection.
For the worst case analysis, we will maximize the LMP
perturbation among the attacks within this specific class. Even
though this approach is suboptimal, the simulation results in
Section VI demonstrate that the resulting LMP perturbation is
much greater than the worst case of the bad meter data.
Suppose the adversary wants to mislead the control center
with the target topology G¯ = (V, E¯), a topology obtained by
removing¶ a set of transmission lines E∆ in G (i.e., E¯ = E \
E∆). We assume that the system with G¯ is observable: i.e., the
corresponding measurement matrix H¯ has full column rank‖.
Suppose that the adversary changes the breaker status such
that the target topology G¯ = (V, E¯) is observed at the control
center. Simultaneously, if the adversary introduces bad data
a = H¯x−Hx, then
za = Hx+ a+ w = H¯x+ w, (31)
which means that the meter data received at the control center
are completely consistent with the model generated from G¯.
Thus, any bad data detector will not be effective.
It is of course not obvious how to produce the bad data
a, especially when the adversary can only modify a limited
§In general, the adversary can design the worst data to affect both the state
estimate and network topology. It is, however, much more difficult to make
such attack undetectable.
¶ Line addition by the adversary is also possible [20]. However, compared
to line removal attacks, line addition attacks require the adversary to observe
a much larger set of meter measurements to design undetectable attacks. In
addition, the number of necessary modifications in breaker data is also much
larger: to make a line appear to be connected, the adversary should make all
the breakers on the line appear to be closed. Please see [21] for the detail.
‖Without observability, the system may not proceed to state estimation and
real-time pricing. Hence, for the adversary to affect pricing, the system with
the target topology has to be observable.
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Fig. 2: Hx and H¯x: Each row is marked by the
corresponding meter (i for injection at i and
(i, j) for flow from i to j).
number of measurements, and it may not have access to
the entire state vector x. Fortunately, it turns out that a can
be generated by observing only a few entries in z without
requiring global information (such as the state vector x) [20].
A key observation is that Hx and H¯x differ only in a few
entries corresponding to the modified topology (lines in E∆)
as illustrated in Fig. 2. Consider first the noiseless case. Let zij
denote the entry of z corresponding to the flow measurement
from i to j. As hinted from Fig. 2, it can be easily seen that
H¯x−Hx has the following sparse structure [20]:
H¯x−Hx = −
∑
(i,j)∈E∆
αijm(i,j), (32)
where αij ∈ R denotes the line flow from i to j when the
line is connected and the system state is x, and m(i,j) is the
column of the measurement-to-branch incidence matrix, that
corresponds to (i, j): i.e., m(i,j) is an m-dimensional vector
with 1 at the entries corresponding to the flow from i to j and
the injection at i, and −1 at the entries for the flow from j to
i and the injection at j, and 0 at all other entries. Absence of
noise implies that zij = αij , which leads to
H¯x−Hx = −
∑
(i,j)∈E∆
zijm(i,j). (33)
With (33) in mind, one can see that setting a = H¯x −
Hx and adding a to z is equivalent to the following simple
procedure: as described in Fig. 3, for each (i, j) in E∆,
1) Subtract zij and zji from zi and zj respectively.
2) Set zij and zji to be 0.
where zi is the entry of z corresponding to the injection
measurement at bus i.
When measurement noise is present (i.e., z = Hx + w),
the idea of the attack is still the same: to make a approximate
H¯x−Hx so that za is close to H¯x+w. Since zij = αij+wij ,
zij is an unbiased estimate of αij for each (i, j) ∈ E∆, and
this implies that −
∑
(i,j)∈E∆
zijm(i,j) is an unbiased estimate
of −
∑
(i,j)∈E∆
αijm(i,j) = H¯x−Hx. Hence, we set a to be
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Unaltered
measurements
Attack-modified
measurements
ii jj
zi
zij zji
zj zi − zij
0 0
zj − zji
Fig. 3: The attack modifies local measurements around
the line (i, j) in E∆.
−
∑
(i,j)∈E∆
zijm(i,j), the same as in the noiseless setting,
and the attack is executed by the same steps as above.
For launching this attack to modify the topology estimate
from G to G¯, the adversary should be able to (i) set b such
that the topology processor produces G¯ instead of G and (ii)
observe and modify zij , zji, zi, and zj for all (i, j) ∈ E∆.
The attack is feasible if and only if A and B contain the
corresponding attack vectors.
To find the worst case LMP perturbation due to unde-
tectable, state-preserving attacks, let F denote the set of
feasible G¯s, for which the attack can be launched with A and
B. Among the feasible targets in F, we consider the best target
topology that results in the maximum perturbation in real-time
LMPs. If ARPP is used as a metric, the best target is chosen
as
G¯∗[z] = arg max
G¯∈F
∑
i
∣∣∣∣λi(z; G¯)− λi(z;G)λi(z;G)
∣∣∣∣ . (34)
where λi(z; G¯) denotes the real-time LMP at bus i when the
attack with the target G¯ is launched on z, and λi(z;G) is the
real-time LMP under no attack.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate the impact of bad data
on real-time LMPs with the numerical simulations on IEEE-
14 and IEEE-118 systems. We conducted simulations in two
different settings: the linear model with the DC state estimator
and the nonlinear model with the AC state estimator. The
former is usually employed in the literature for the ease of
analysis whereas the latter represents the practical state esti-
mator used in the real-world power system. In all simulations,
the meter measurements consist of real power injections at all
buses and real power flows (both directions) at all branches.
A. Linear model with DC state estimation
We first present the simulation results for the linear model
with the DC state estimator. We modeled bus voltage mag-
nitudes and phases as Gaussian random variables with the
means equal to the day-ahead dispatched values and small
standard deviations. In each Monte Carlo run, we generated
a state realization from the statistical model, and the meter
measurements were created by the DC model with Gaussian
measurement noise. Once the measurements were created,
bad data were added in the manners discussed in Section IV
and Section V. With the corrupted measurements, the control
center executed the DC state estimation and the bad data test
with the false alarm probability constraint 0.1. If the data
passed the bad data test, real-time LMPs were evaluated based
on the state estimation results. For IEEE-14 and IEEE-118
system, the network parameters∗∗ are available in [22].
We used the number of meter data to be modified by the
adversary as the metric for the attack effort. For the 14 bus
system, in each Monte Carlo run, we randomly chose two
lines, and the adversary was able to modify all the line flow
meters on the lines and injection meters located at the ends of
the lines. For the 118 bus system, we randomly chose three
lines, and the adversary had control over the associated line
and injection meters. Both state and topology attacks were set
to control the same number of meter data†† so that we can
fairly compare their impacts on real-time LMPs. As for the
meter data attack, we only considered the lines that are close
to their flow limits (estimated flows under M1 and M2, or
actual flows under M3) as candidates for congestion pattern
search. The threshold is chosen as 10MW in our simulation.
Fig. 4 is the plot of ARPPs‡‡ versus detection probabilities
of bad data. They show that even when bad data were detected
with low probability, ARPPs were large, especially for the
fully adaptive bad meter data and the bad topology data.
Comparing ARPPs of the three bad meter data models,
we observe that the adversary may significantly improve the
perturbation amount by exploiting partial or all real-time meter
data (for the partially adaptive case, the adversary observed a
half of all meters.) It is worthy to point out that bad topology
data result in much greater price perturbation than bad meter
data.
Recall the discussion in Section II and Section V that bad
topology data and bad meter data employ different price-
perturbing mechanisms: bad topology data perturb real-time
LMP by restructuring the price regions without perturbing the
state estimate (the line-removal attack introduced in Section V
does not perturb state estimate) whereas bad meter data perturb
real-time LMP by simply moving the state estimate to a
different price region. Therefore, the observation implies that
restructuring the price regions has much greater impact on
real-time LMP than merely perturbing the state estimate.
B. Nonlinear model with AC state estimation
The simulations with the nonlinear model intend to inves-
tigate the vulnerability of the real-world power system to the
∗∗ In addition to the network parameters given in [22], we used the
following line limit and real-time offer parameters. In the IEEE-14 simulation,
the generators at the buses 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 had capacities 330, 140, 100, 100,
and 100 MW and the real-time offers 15, 31, 30, 10, and 20 $/MW. Lines (2,
3), (4, 5), and (6, 11) had line capacities 50, 50, and 20 MW, and other lines
had no line limit. In the IEEE-118 simulation, the generators had generation
costs arbitrarily selected from {20, 25, 30, 35, 40 $/MW} and generation
capacities arbitrarily selected from {200, 250, 300, 350, 400 MW}. Total 16
lines had the line capacities arbitrarily selected from {70, 90, 110 MW}, and
other lines had no line limit. To handle possible occurrence of price spikes, we
set the upper and lower price caps as 500$/MW and -100$/MW respectively.
Total 1000 Monte Carlo runs were executed for each case.
††Topology attacks need to make few additional modifications on breaker
state data such that the target lines appear to be disconnected to the topology
processor. However, for simplicity, we do not take into account this additional
effort.
‡‡The detection probabilities for the fully adaptive bad meter data and the
bad topology data cases were less than 0.1 in all the simulations. In the
figures, we draw ARPPs of those cases as horizontal lines so that we can
compare them with other cases.
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(b) IEEE-118: ARPP of the worst topology data is 22.4%.
Fig. 4: Linear model: ARPP vs detection prob.
worst adversarial act, designed based on the linear model.
The simulations were conducted on IEEE-14 and IEEE-118
systems in the same manner as the linear case except that we
employed the nonlinear model and the AC state estimation.
Fig. 5 is the plot of ARPPs versus detection probabilities.
The result shows that the proposed methodology can affect the
system to some extent even when nonlinear estimator is used,
especially when the bad data are present in the topology data,
although the nonlinear estimator makes this effect relatively
less significant compared with the linear case results.
C. Performance of the greedy search heuristic
We also conducted simulation based on the proposed greedy
search technique in Section IV-E. The simulation was based
on 118 bus system, and all parameters were the same as those
presented in Section VI-A. We compared the performance
and computation time of the greedy heuristics with exhaustive
search benchmark, as shown in Table I. Notice here the
exhaustive search and greedy search are both over the lines
that are close to their flow limits (estimated flows under M1
and M2, or actual flows under M3), the same as in Section
VI-A. In Table I, the second column (average search time) is
the average searching time for worst congestion pattern over
1000 Monte Carlo runs, and the third column (accuracy) is
the percentage that the greedy search find the same worst
congestion pattern as the exhaustive search. From the result,
we can see that using greedy heuristic can give us much faster
processing algorithm without losing much of the accuracy.
VII. CONCLUSION
We report in this paper a study on impacts of worst data on
the real-time market operation. A key result of this paper is the
TABLE I: Performance of greedy search method
method average search time accuracy
exhaustive search 1.23s -
greedy search 0.51s 97.3%
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Fig. 5: Nonlinear model: ARPP vs detection prob.
geometric characterization of real-time LMP given in Theorem
1. This result provides insights into the relation between data
and the real-time LMP; it serves as the basis of characterizing
impacts of bad data.
Our investigation includes bad data scenarios that arise from
both analog meter measurements and digital breaker state data.
To this end, we have presented a systematic approach by
casting the problem as one involving an adversary injecting
malicious data. While such an approach often gives overly
conservative analysis, it can be used as a measure of assurance
when the impacts based on worst case analysis are deemed
acceptable. We note that, because we use adversary attacks as
a way to study the worst data, our results have direct implica-
tions when cyber-security of smart grid is considered. Given
the increasing reliance on information networks, developing
effective countermeasures against malicious data attack on the
operations of a future smart grid is crucial. See [8], [23], [10],
[21] for discussion about countermeasures.
From a practical viewpoint, our result can serve as the
guideline to the real-time operation. Following the method-
ology in our paper, worst effect of a specific set of meters
on real-time LMP can be checked. Once a huge potential
perturbation is detected, alarm should be made and the op-
erator needs to check the accuracy of these specific data, add
protection devices, or even add more redundant meters.
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Although our findings are obtained from academic bench-
marks involving relatively small size networks, we believe that
the general trend that characterizes the effects of bad data is
likely to persist in practical networks of much larger size. In
particular, as the network size increases and the number of
simultaneous appearance of bad data is limited, the effects of
the worst meter data on LMP decrease whereas the effects of
the worst topology data stay nonnegligible regardless of the
network size. This observation suggests that the bad topology
data are potentially more detrimental to the real-time market
operation than the bad meter data.
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